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Nuclear weapons

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Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear weapons --- Accidents --- Accidents --- International cooperation.

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On 20–21 February 2014 in Warsaw, the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in cooperation with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN) organised the workshop: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Related to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Cost-Benefit Matrix. The workshop sought to advance the informal dialogue on information-sharing and transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe. The idea behind the workshop was based on the concept of a Joint TCBM Cost-Benefit Matrix, outlined in the final report of the 2013 Warsaw Workshop: Prospects for Information-Sharing and Confidence-Building on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe.

Nuclear weapons. --- Nuclear warfare.

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This book reveals for the first time the historic deliberations regarding the Chevaline upgrade to Britain's Polaris force, the decisions to procure the Trident C-4 and then D-5 system from the Americans in 1980 and 1982. It also details the highly controversial decision to base Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in the UK in 1983. Chevaline was one of the most expensive and technically difficult defence projects the British had yet undertaken. It took much of its rationale from intelligence assessments of Soviet anti-ballistic missiles which had planted doubts as to the effectiveness of Polaris as the UK's strategic deterrent. The Polaris-Chevaline system remained in service until it was gradually replaced with Trident in 1994. The first deal over Trident (the C-4 decision in 1980) was informed by the Chevaline experience and the penalties of a lack of commonality with the United States. The decision benefitted from a comprehensive study known as the Duff-Mason Report which was the key background document used by the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher in the purchase of C-4. The decision to opt for the increased striking power of Trident II D-5 was also driven by the penalties of time-limited commonality with the Americans. It remains operational with both the Royal Navy and United States Navy.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY--GREAT BRITAIN--HISTORY

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Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear nonproliferation --- Maintenance and repair. --- Storage --- Maintenance and repair --- Finance. --- Storage --- Finance. --- United States.